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RECENT UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT
REFORMS: CONGRESS CATCHES THE
SPIRIT OF BERNE
Graeme B. Dinwoodie*
At the turn of the year President Bush signed into law a series of
miscellaneous but significant reforms of United States copyright
law. They reflect a continuing attempt by Congress through piece-
meal reform to fine-tune copyright law and bring about full compli-
ance with the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (Paris Text, 1971) (the "Berne Convention" or
"Berne").
The latest measures are found in the Judicial Improvements Act'
and the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act.2 They (1) provide in-
creased protection against the unauthorized copying of computer
programs; (2) create copyright protection for the design of con-
structed works of architecture; (3) grant rights to protect the non-
economic interests of certain visual artists; and (4) confirm that the
states and their agencies can be held fully liable for copyright in-
fringement. As a result of political maneuvering the "fair use" pro-
visions of the legislation - which had been the subject of
considerable debate last summer - were not adopted. A compro-
mise bill containing similar fair use proposals has, however, been
introduced in the new session of Congress.3
JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS ACT
The Judicial Improvements Act (the "JIA") includes titles affect-
ing the scope of copyright protection granted to computer software,
the design of works of architecture, and works of "visual art."
These last two topics have been particularly prominent on the Con-
gressional agenda since the United States accession to the Berne
* Associate, Sullivan & Cromwell, New York, N.Y.; Member of the New York
Bar; LL.B. (Hons.), 1987, University of Glasgow; LL.M., 1988, Harvard Law School.
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1. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(1990) (to be codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.) (pertinent parts codified in scat-
tered sections of 17 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1991)) [hereinafter JIA].
2. Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749
.(1990) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a) & 511).
3. S. 1035, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2372, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
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Convention. For a variety of reasons, accession has been guided by
a minimalist philosophy - "making only those changes to American
copyright law that [were] clearly required under the treaty's provi-
sions."14 Many commentators believed that, even under a mininalist
approach, amendment of United States law was necessary in the ar-
eas of "moral rights" and works of architecture, but not sufficiently
undertaken.' Fortunately, accession has marked the beginning, not
the end, of a renewed attempt to match United States law to the
mnimumr standards of international copyright protection.6 The re-
forms relating to architectural works and works of visual art are
small, but important, steps toward a more wholehearted United
States adoption of the Berne Convention.7
4. H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Seas. 7 (1988).
5. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg & John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and Two
Years Later: The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 CoLum.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 24
(1988) [hereinafter Ginsburg & Kernochan].
6. See Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 5, at 6 ("In retrospect, and consider-
ing how close the whole effort came to being derailed in its closing stages, it would
seem the proponents of this [minimalist] approach were right. The price paid was
arguably a less than full embracing of the 'Spirit of Berne' in its broadest sense. But
adherence, the principal goal, was in fact attained. New battles to move United
States law further toward a fuller acceptance of Berne's wider implications will cer-
tainly be fought in the future."). Some expressed concern that the formal act of
adherence would hinder the elevation of United States copyright protection to in-
ternational standards by creating the illusion that those standards had already been
attained. Edward I. Damich, Moral Rights in the United States and Article 6his of
the Berne Convention: A Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc Work-
ing Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 CoLUm.-VLA J.L. & ARTs
655, 663 (1986) ("From the point of view of a moral rights advocate, however,
there is the danger that adherence will impede the full recognition of moral rights
in the United States by providing confirmation that the existing paltry acceptance is
equivalent to the meaningful protection embodied in Article 6his.").
7. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the
Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of
1990, 14 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 477, 497 (1990) ("The 1990 Visual Artists Rights
Act and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act enhance the U.S.' com-
pliance with Berne Convention standards .... Congress continued to adhere to its
'minimalist' approach to enlargement of copyright protections. This cautious, if not
begrudging, strategy may provoke criticism that the U.S. remains reluctant to fulfill
Berne mandates .... Nonetheless, U.S. progress, albeit slow, is real.") (footnotes
omitted). A continuation of this strategy has led to the introduction in the new ses-
sion of Congress of a bill providing for the automatic renewal of copyright in pre-
1978 works. See S. 756, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2372, 102d Cong., 1st
Ses. (1991); see also Comments of Dorothy Schrader (Copyright Office) to the
International Copyright Panel of the State Department's Advisory Committee on
Intellectual Property, 41 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 433 (1991); see also
Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Con-
vention, 10 CoLum.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 513, 581 (1986) ("The renewal registration
requirement and duration of renewed copyrights under the U.S. Copyright Act with
respect to works of foreign origin are incompatible with Berne because of the impo-
sition of formalities and a shorter than required total term."); The Staff of the U.S.
Copyright Office, Implementing Legislation to Permit U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Copyright Refozms
Works of Architecture
The Berne Convention contemplates copyright protection for both
architectural plans and completed structures. Article 2(1) (includ-
ing separately within list of "literary and artistic works," "works...
of architecture" and "plans... and three dimensional works relative
to... architecture")." At the time of accession, United States law
was adequate with respect to the protection of plans (at least insofar
as two-dimensional reproduction was concerned).9 However, the
United States' reluctance to protect utilitarian aspects of works
threatened to preclude protection of completed structures.10
Convention: A Draft Discussion Bill & Commentary, 10 CoLum.-VLA J.L. & Amrs
621, 634-36 (1986) (proposing automatic renewal of copyright in foreign works in
order to comply with the provisions of the Berne Convention).
8. Cf. James Bingham Bucher, Comment, Reinforcing the Foundation: The
Case Against Copyright Protection For Works of Architecture, 39 EmoRY L.J. 1261,
1284-85 (1990) (arguing that since the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") permitted the United States to join the Berne Convention based on ex-
isting protection for "architectural works" there is no need to change existing
United States law).
9. See generally Natalie Wargo, Note, Copyright Protection for Architecture
and the Berne Convention, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 403 (1990) (evaluating the compati-
bility of American copyright protection for architecture and the corresponding ob-
ligations of the Berne Convention); David E. Shipley, Copyright Protection for
Architectural Works, 37 S.C.L. Rzv. 393 (1986) (discussing the nature and scope of
protection afforded to architectural works under U.S. Copyright Law); Elizabeth A.
Brainard, Note, Innovation and Imitation: Artistic Advance and the Legal Protec-
tion of Architectural Works, 70 CoRN= L. Rzv. 81 (1984) (evaluating the appropri-
ate level of protection of architectural works).
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (design of a useful article only considered a
pictorial, graphic or sculptural work to the extent that such features of the design
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article). Moreover, United States courts have not permitted
copyright in two-dimensional plans to afford effective protection of the three-di-
mensional structure depicted therein; construction will only be enjoined if the sec-
ond builder is using plans which are themselves infringing. Robert R. Jones Assocs.
v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 280 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[o]ne may construct a house
which is identical to a house depicted in copyrighted architectural plans, but one
may not directly copy those plans and then use the infringing copy to construct the
house."); see also Kunycia v. Melville Realty Co., 755 F. Supp. 566, 576 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Intown Enters. Inc. v. Barnes, 721 F. Supp. 1263 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Herman
Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (E.D. Mich. 1973). Compare
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48 (Eng.) § 17(3) [hereinafter
CDPA] ("Copying" of an artistic work includes the making of a copy in three
dimensions of a two-dimensional work.). In Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp.
658, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), even the use of infringing plans by the defendant did not
convince the court that the second construction could be enjoined. The current
U.K. legislation expressly includes within the definition of protectible artistic works
"a work of architecture being a building or a model for a building." CDPA
§ 4(l)(b). Moreover, this is not a new development in U.K. law. See, e.g., Meilde v.
Maufe, [19411 3 All E.R. 144 (interpreting the Copyright Act of 1911, copyright
subsisted in a building separate and distinct from the copyright in the plans from
which it was built).
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The legislation which was enacted to effect United States compli-
ance with its obligations under the Berne Convention expanded the
definition of protected "pictorial, graphic or sculptural works" to ex-
pressly include architectural plans or models." However, it did not
address the protection of architectural structures themselves, which
was where the deficiency appeared to lie. Following accession to
Berne, at the request of a Congress unsure of the sufficiency of its
amendments in this field, 12 the Register of Copyrights undertook a
study to determine whether United States law afforded protection to
works of architecture within the meaning of the Convention.'" The
Register's report concluded that, despite the protection of architec-
tural plans and models, some doubt remained as to whether United
States copyright law unequivocally satisfied Berne Convention stan-
dards with respect to the constructed design of architectural struc-
tures.' 4 The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (Title
VII of the hA) removes that doubt."i
The 1990 amendments add a new section to the Copyright Act
conferring copyright protection on "works of architecture." The
scope of that protection extends to the design of constructed works,
as is made clear in the definition of "architectural work":
An "architectural work" is the design of a building as embodied
in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, archi-
tectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the overall form as
well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements
in the design, but does not include individual standard features. 16
Protection as an "architectural work" is afforded to the design not
only as contained in plans or drawings, but also as embodied in the
completed structure. This dual protection of plans (they are also
protected as pictorial or graphic works) for the period prior to erec-
'tion of the building serves to prevent the creation of a window be-
tween planning and construction in which, under existing copyright
law, the unauthorized use of the plans to construct a building would
11. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 4(a),
102 Stat. 2853 (1988). See David M. Larsen, Note, The Effect of the Berne Imple-
mentation Act of 1988 on Copyright Protection for Architectural Structures, 1990
U. Ium. L. 1Ev. 151 (1990).
12. See S. IEP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1988).
13. See Copyright in Works of Architecture: A Report of the Register of Copy-
rights (June 1989), reprinted in 38 Pat. Trademark & Copyright 1. (BNA) 936
(1989) (Executive Summary).
14. Id. at 221.
15. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990) (codified in scattered sections
of 17 U.S.C.A.). Doubts have been expressed as to what constitutes a "building."
See David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, Legislation by the 101st Congress, N.Y.
L.J. 3, 34 (1991). The U.K. Act defines a building as including "any fixed structure,
and a part of a building or fixed structure." CDPA § 4(2).
.16. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1991).
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not be prohibited. 17
This copyright protection is subject to two limitations. It does not
include "the right to prevent the making, distributing, or public dis-
play of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial represen-
tations of the work, if the building in which the work is embodied is
located in or ordinarily visible from a public place." ' Nor does the
amendment curtail the right of the owner of the building to make
alterations of or destroy the building or to authorize these
activities. 19
Works of Visual Art
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention requires protection of two
species of what are commonly called "moral rights." This phrase
classically encompasses an author's rights of: (i) paternity or attribu-
tion (the right to have authorship recognized); (ii) integrity (the right
to prevent distortion of the artist's work); (iii) disclosure (the right to
control publication of the artist's work);"- and (iv) withdrawal (the
right to withdraw, modify or disavow a work after its publication). 1
The Convention requires that member states recognize the rights of
17. See supra note 10. H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1990).
18. 17 U.S.C.A. § 120(a) (West Supp. 1991); compare CDPA § 62 (copyright in
(a) buildings, and (b) sculptures, models for buildings and works of artistic crafts-
manship, if permanently situated in a public place or in premises open to the pub-
lic, not infringed by making a graphic work representing, a photograph or film of,
or broadcasting or including in a cable program service a visual image of, any such
work). The U.K. provision - by treating buildings and publicly accessible sculp-
tures alike - displays a consistency lacking in the United States provision. There is
no logical basis to override the architect's copyright but not that of the sculptor in
an equivalent situation. See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 495 ("There is no apparent
reason a Frank Lloyd Wright should not retain control over posters, post cards and
T-shirts depicting the Guggenheim Museum, while an Alexander Calder may con-
trol, or receive compensation for, equivalent exploitations of his outdoor stabiles.").
19. 17 U.S.C.A. § 120(b) (West Supp. 1991). State and local landmark, historic
preservation, zoning, or building codes relating to works of architecture are not
preempted by this provision. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(b)(4) (West Supp. 1991). Com-
pare CDPA § 65 (Reconstruction of a building does not infringe the copyright in
the building or the plans in accordance with which it was constructed.).
20. The restrictive application of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works con-
tributes to providing a United States parallel to this component of moral rights. It is
therefore somewhat ironic that, contemporaneous with the first recognition of moral
rights by the federal legislature, Congress was considering broadening the permis-
sible fair use of unpublished works. See infra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
21. The United States right of termination is a weak equivalent of this right -
although in one regard it is the most satisfactory equivalent, as it resides in the
author and cannot be assigned. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5) (1988). The predecessor of
the termination right, the renewal right, can be assigned - but such assignment
will only be effective if the author lives until the date of renewal. Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207, 217 (1990); Marascalco v. Fantasy, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1409
(C.D. Cal. 1990).
1991]
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integrity and attribution. 2
Accession to Berne
When the United States acceded to the Berne Convention, and
enacted amendments to the Copyright Act to implement it, Con-
gress concluded that existing state and federal laws afforded suffi-
cient protection to comply with Article 6bis:
According to the [majority] view, there is a composite of laws in
this country that provides the kind of protection envisioned by Ar-
ticle 6bis. Federal laws include 17 U.S.C. § 106, relating to de-
rivative works, 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2), relating to distortions of
musical works used under the compulsory license respecting
sound recordings; 17 U.S.C. § 203, relating to termination of
transfers and licenses, and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, relat-
ing to false designations of origin and false descriptions. State
and local laws include those relating to publicity, contractual vio-
lations, fraud and misrepresentation, unfair competition, defama-
tion, and invasion of privacy. In addition, eight states have
recently enacted specific statutes protecting the rights of integrity
and paternity in certain works of art. Finally, some courts have
recognized the equivalent of such rights.2
3
Accordingly, the United States acceded to the Berne Convention
without any amendment of its law to accommodate moral rights.
However, the various causes of action upon which claims of ade-
quate moral rights protection were premised contain elements that
limit their effectiveness.2 4 Accession was completed relying more
22. 2 PAUS GoimsTm, CopmoRT: PRmCIPLES, LAw AM PRACTICE § 15.23 (1989)
[hereinafter GoDsT=m]; Roberta R. Kwall, Copyright And The Moral Right: Is An
American Marriage Possible?, 38 VaNn. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985); see generally Russell J.
DaSilva, Droit Moral and The Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in
France and the U.S., 28 BULL. Copy-uHT Soc'y 1 (1980).
23. H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
24. The conclusion that United States law was compatible with the moral rights
requirements of Article 6bis was fiercely disputed by moral rights' advocates. See,
e.g., Damich, supra note 6, at 661 ("When the language of Article 6bis is. com-
pared with the evidence that has been offered to suggest that moral rights are sub-
stantially protected in the U.S., it is clear that, aside from some recently-passed
[state] statutes .... moral rights are not protected in any meaningful sense."); John
M. Kernochan, Comments of John M. Kernochan, 10 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARa 685,
686 (1986) ("The conclusion that the U.S. law is compatible with Berne here and
recognizes moral rights in any sense comparable to that intended by most of the
Berne signatories is tenuous indeed."); Deborah Ross, Comment, The United States
Joins the Berne Convention: New Obligations for Authors' Moral Rights?, 68 N.C.
L. REv. 363, 364 (1990) ("In reaching this conclusion, however, Congress failed to
recognize the distinction between economic and moral rights; as a result, the
United States claims full adherence to Berne but lacks the legal structure to support
the full array of rights provided by the Convention."). See contra Letter from Dr.
Arpad Bogsch, Director General of WIPO, to Irwin Karp, Esq. (June 16, 1987),
reprinted in pertinent part in H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1988)
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upon the belief that United States protection was no more deficient
than that of other signatories, than on the firm conviction that it met
Berne standards. 25 Certainly, a panoply of United States legal doc-
trines offers protections analogous to those required by Article 6bis.
For example, the federal law of unfair competition as set forth in the
Lanham Act may allow an author to insist upon attribution of his
work if failure to do so would amount to a misrepresentation.
Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp.2" (cause of action is stated
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act where authorship of musical work
is attributed to some, but not all, of the co-authors).27 The same Act
may provide the basis for an artist to prevent the distortion of his
work. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos.2 - ("an allegation that
a defendant has presented to the public a 'garbled,' distorted ver-
sion of plaintiff's work seeks to redress the very rights sought to be
protected by the Lanham Act and should be recognized as stating a
cause of action under that statute".) or at least to prevent the presen-
tation of the distorted, garbled or mutilated work under his name.2 9
If the distorted work reflects adversely upon the author's reputa-
("In my view, it is not necessary for the United States of America to enact statutory
provisions on moral rights in order to comply with Article 6his of the Berne Con-
vention. The requirements under this Article can be fulfilled not only by statutory
provisions in a copyright statute but also by common law and other statutes. I be-
lieve that in the United States the common law and such statutes (Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act) contain the necessary law to fulfill any obligation for the United
States under Article 6bis.").
25. "It is the lack of effective compliance among Berne countries, rather than
the protection given moral rights in American law, that removes Article 6bis as an
obstacle to U.S. adherence." Damich, supra note 6, at 655. Moral rights is an issue
high on the agenda of the European Commission. The Commission recently pro-
posed a Council Decision requiring all European Community countries by Decem-
ber 31, 1992, to comply with the Berne Convention and the Rome Convention for
the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisa-
lions ("Rome Convention"). See Follow-up to the Green Paper: Working Pro-
gramme of the Commission in the Field of Copyright and Neighboring Rights,
COM(90)584 final at Ch. 1.11.5 [hereinafter Working Programme]; see also id. at
Ch. 8.3 (harmonization of moral rights). The United States has not acceded to the
Rome Convention.
26. 847 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1988).
27. See Rosenfeld v. W.B. Saunders, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 236, 243 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) ("Any false attribution of principal authorship constitutes a section 43(a) vio-
lation if it misrepresents the contributions of the person designated as author. Thus,
failure to attribute authorship to a co-author resulting in only a partially accurate
designation of origin constitutes reverse palming off within the ambit of section
43(a).") (citations omitted), aff'd mem., 923 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Smith
v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) (violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act
where actor's name omitted from credits and replaced by another); Dodd v. Fort
Smith Special School Dist. No. 100, 666 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D. Ark. 1987); Marling
v. Ellison, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 702, 714 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Follet v. New Am. Li-
brary, 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
28. 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 25; Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516
1991)
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tion, its publication may constitute defamation.30 If the distortion
amounts to the creation of a "derivative work," the Copyright Act
may provide a remedy.3 1 Contractual restrictions can effect the
same rights as required by Article 6bis, although both the limited
scope of contract - privity, for example - and the realities of art-
ists' bargaining positions undermine this as a basis for effective
protection. 2
These "equivalent" rights are, however, dependent upon exterior
circumstances that should be of no relevance to the subsistence of
(S.D.N.Y 1978); CBS, Inc. v. Springboard Int'l Records, 429 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc. 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
30. Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187, 192, 168 N.E.2d 643,
646, 203 N.Y.S.2d 812, 816 (1960) ("Ihe purchase of the copyright did not carry
with it a license to defame by impliedly misrepresenting plaintiff as [the reviser of a
subsequent edition of his work].").
31. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 20. In addition to the general limitations inherent in
pursuing the protection of moral rights through the Copyright Act, see infra, notes
37-38 and accompanying text, many modifications or mutilations will not possess
sufficient originality to be a "derivative work" and thus will not infringe the copy-
right owner's rights. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broadcasting Sys., 724
F. Supp. 808, 820 (D. Kan. 1989) (Addition of commercial to beginning of video-
cassette did not transform the motion picture in such a way as to constitute an unau-
thorized derivative work.). Additionally, Paul Goldstein has noted: "The paradox
of relying on derivative rights to vindicate an author's interest in the integrity of her
work is that the more extreme the defendant's distortion is, the less it can be said to
be based on the original and thus to violate the derivative right in the original. If
the distortion is so extreme that it takes only the original author's ideas but not her
expression, the taking will not infringe the derivative right." 2 GoLDsrr
§ 15.24.1.2 (1989).
32. Even this intricate patchwork of remedies is unable to cover all aspects of
the rights of attribution and integrity. For example, an author cannot insist upon
attribution when the violative act is not false attribution, but complete non-attribu-
tion. Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947). The problem of
complete non-attribution cannot be addressed under the Lanham Act because its
remedies are dependent upon false attribution to another, or misrepresentation of
the extent of an author's contribution. But see Mmvmzn, B. Nmz'mz & DAvD Numam,
NIMMR oN CopYmo'rr § 8.21[E] (1991) (arguing that the language of Smith v.
Montoro - in particular, the suggestion in dicta that "implied reverse palming off"
is actionable under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act - contemplates an action based
upon complete non-attribution); cf. Boothroyd Dev., Inc. v. Poli, No. 89-1650 (D.
Mass. June 12, 1991), reported at News & Comment, Reverse Palming Off Under
Section 43(a) is not Actionable in First Circuit, 42 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 337 (Aug. 8, 1991) (Montoro presents facts which could not give rise to
Section 43(a) claim in the First Circuit because that section does not extend to "re-
verse palming off."). Similarly, a work is granted minimal protection against its
complete destruction, Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 576,
89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949), although the Berne Convention does
not require a right to prevent "destruction" of works. One of the changes made in
the final version of the bill was to limit actionable "destructions" to acts committed
intentionally or with gross negligence and only then in relation to "works of recog-
nized stature." See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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moral rights. Moral rights are clearly not protected as such.3 3 Their
vindication under existing United States law depended upon a fortu-
itous coincidence of the remedies sought by the artist with a remedy
aimed at effectuating a different legal right. When the purposes un-
derlying that right diverge - as they will - from those at the root of
moral rights, the so-called "moral rights" evaporate.3 4 For example,
in the Ninth Circuit unfair competition law only affords a basis to
correct false attribution of an author's work if there is competition
between plaintiff and defendant.3 5 The protection of a work under
the Lanham Act is dependent upon a misrepresentation and the like-
lihood of public confusion - in certain circumstances an appropri-
ate acknowledgement that the work had been edited or revised,
might defeat a Lanham Act claim.3 6 Any deployment of the Copy-
right Act in support of moral rights will require that the author re-
mains the owner (assuming that he ever was)3 7 of the copyright
because the Copyright Act vindicates only the economic interest un-
33. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24; Weinstein v. University of M., 811 F.2d 1091,
1095 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987); Society of Survivors of the Riga Ghetto, Inc. v. Hut-
tenbach, 141 Misc. 2d 921, 926-7, 535 N.Y.S.2d 670, 673-4 (Sup. Ct. 1988); cf.
Edison v. Viva Int'l Ltd., 70 A.D.2d 379, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203 (App. Div. 1979).
34. See Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 5, at 35-6 nn.122, 124; Jane C.
Ginsburg, Moral Rights in a Common Law System, 4 ENT. L.R. 121, 124 (1990).
35. Halicki v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th
Cir. 1987). See also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462-3 (9th Cir.
1988) (imitation of professional singer's voice by "soundalike" in television com-
mercial would not constitute unfair competition because plaintiff did not do televi-
sion commercials and thus was not in competition with defendants; Lamothe, 847
F.2d at 1406; Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., No. CV87-3344 JGD, 1989
WL 164359 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 1989), aff'd mem., 914 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 60 (1991).).
36. Rosenfeld v. W.B. Saunders, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 236, 243-4 (S.D.N.Y.) (dis-
claimer adequate to prevent confusion, thus defeating § 43(a) claim), aH'd mem.,
923 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1990). The burden of demonstrating the sufficiency of the
disclaimer lies with the defendant. 728 F. Supp. at 243; Home Box Office, Inc. v.
Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 1315-6 (2d Cir. 1987); see
also Charles of the Ritz Group, Ltd. v. Quality King Distributors, Inc., 832 F.2d
1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1987). Indeed, the remedy for violation of § 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act may often simply be to require an appropriate acknowledgement of the
artist's role by means of disclaimer. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Springboard Int'l Servs.,
429 F. Supp. at 569. In the circumstances presented in Gilliam, the majority did
not believe that the disclaimer proposed by the district court offered sufficient re-
lief. Compare Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25 n.13; of. CDPA § 103(2) (Court may remedy
infringement of right of integrity by requiring disclaimer disassociating author from
treatment of the work.).
37. The assumption that the author was the owner cannot readily be made in the
United States, in particular as a result of the "work for hire doctrine." See 17 U.S.C
§ 101 (1988). The large gap that this effectively creates in moral rights protection
probably does not affect United States compliance with its Berne obligations. Gins-
burg & Kernochan, supra note 5, at 34. Indeed, the size of that gap may have been
reduced by the decision of the Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
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derlying the grant of copyright.38
State Protection of Moral Rights
There has been express recognition of moral rights by various
state legislatures.3 9 Within the limited spheres of operation of state
statutes - in terms of geography, activities prohibited, and types of
works covered - they achieve a measure of protection. Such pro-
tection exists only in a small minority of states, however, and the
level of protection varies.4 ° The circumscribed ambit of such state
protection can be seen by comparing two of the most prominent ex-
amples. New York's Artists' Authorship Rights Act4 ' concentrates
on protecting the artist's reputation by prohibiting the public display
or publication of works of fine art or limited editions, or reproduc-
38. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 ("American copyright law, as presently written,
does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation,
since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of
authors."). Article 6bis requires that moral rights be granted to the artist "in-
dependent of the economic interest." On this most fundamental point, the Copy-
right Act's protection of moral rights is exposed as ephemeral. Only the legal or
beneficial owner of the copyright can institute an infringement action. 17 U.S.C.
§ 501(b) (1988). Thus, once the copyright is transferred the purported moral right
is lost because the original author can no longer bring an action to enforce the
copyright. As a result of the divergence in the policies underlying copyright and
moral rights, privacy protections - which have their basis in the artist's personality
- may provide a vehicle for the development of moral rights which is less depen-
dent upon happenstance.
39. See, e.g., CAL. Cirv. CODE § 980-990 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 4 2-116s - 42-116t (West Supp. 1991); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1211/2
para. 1401-1408 (1989); LA. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 51:2151-51:2156 (West 1987);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1988); MAss. Ass. LAws ch. 231, § 855
(Law. Co-op. 1986); Nsv. REv. STAT. Ass. §§ 598.970 - 598.978 (Michie 1989); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-1 - 2A:24A-8 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. Arm. § 13-4B-3
( ichie Supp. 1988) and §§ 56-11-1 to 56-11-3 (Michie Supp. 1986); N.Y. Ass &
CULT. An'. LAw §§ 11.01-16.01 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
73 §§ 2101-2110 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 5-62-2 to 5-62-6 (1987).
40. See Paul Geller, Comments on Possible U.S. Compliance with Article 6his
of the Berne Convention, 10 Co,.um.-VLA 1L. & ARTs 665, 668 (1986) (noting that
the existence of such statutes in some states serves only to expose the lack of pro-
tection in others). The objectives of moral rights laws are also incidentally pro-
moted by other state enactments such as anti-piracy statutes. See, e.g., California
Record Piracy Law, CAL. PENA CODE § 653w (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) (criminaliz-
ing failure of those who commercially market audio or audiovisual works to clearly
identify the actual manufacturer, author, artist, performer, producer, programmer,
or group on the outside cover box or jacket); the disclosure requirement of § 653w
is neither violative of the First Amendment nor pre-empted by the Copyright Act.
People v. Anderson, 286 Cal. Rptr. 734 (Ct. App. 1991).
41. N.Y. Axs & CuLT. AF'. Law § 14.03 (McKinney 1984); see Edward J.
Damich, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative Critique, 84
CoLum. L. REv. 1733 (1984); Sarah Ann Smith, Note, The New York Artists'Author-
ship lights Act Increased Protection and Enhanced Status for Visual Artists, 70
CoRNE. L. Rzv. 158 (1984).
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tions thereof, in altered or mutilated form if the work is displayed,
published or reproduced as being the work of the artist (or under
circumstances in which it would reasonably be regarded as being
the work of the artist) "and damage to the artist's reputation is rea-
sonably likely to result therefrom."42 California's Art Preservation
Act43 attempts directly to prevent the loss or physical alteration of
works of fine art, declaring that "the physical alteration or destruc-
tion of fine art, which is an expression of the artist's personality, is
detrimental to the artist's reputation .... 44
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
Congress continued to pursue establishment of a uniform national
system of moral rights, claiming that its position "reflected neutral-
ity, not antipathy."45 During congressional consideration of pro-
posed legislation designed to create such a system, it became clear
that the ease with which these rights would coexist with the eco-
42. N.Y. AR-S & Cuir. An. LAw § 14.03(1); see Wojnarowicz v. American Fam-
ily Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 136-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Distribution of fragmented
reproductions of an artist's work with attribution to the artist violated New York's
Artists' Authorship Rights Act.). But see Morita v. Omni Publications Int'l, Ltd., 741
F. Supp. 1107, 1114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Juxtaposition of a poster created solely to
depict anti-nuclear message together with a pro-nuclear text so as to place the work
in a context unauthorized, and opposed, by the artist did not constitute a "mutila-
tion" such as to violate the New York statute.) vacated as moot, 760 F. Supp. 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
43. CAL. Crv. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
45. H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988). Indeed, even after this
most recent enactment, Congress continues to contemplate additional artists' rights.
As mandated by the Act, JIA § 608(b), on February 1, 1991 the Register of Copy-
rights requested comments on the feasibility of granting royalties to artists on re-
sales of their works - although this is more truly an economic, rather than a moral,
right. The right of droit de suite - the artist's right to receive a part of any profit
made on a resale of his painting or sculpture - was rejected by the U.K. govern-
ment in the White Paper that led to the CDPA. See hI T.EcTuAL PROpERTY AND Iio-
VwToiN, 1986, CMND 9712, at 11 19.13-16 [hereinafter the White Paper]. The
European Commission is continuing to examine the advisability of a Community
initiative on the question of resale rights. Working Programme, Ch. 8.5. These
rights will not be covered by the proposed council decision requiring compliance
with the Berne Convention, see supra, note 25, as the Berne Convention permits,
but does not require, member countries to extend droit de suite. Article 14ter. See
generally Monroe E. Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists:
The Case of the Droit de Suite, 77 YAL, L.J. 1333 (1968); see also William A. Carle-
ton III, Note, Copyright Protection for Visual Artists: A Display-Based Alternative to
the Droit de Suite, 76 Cou-rn. L. BEv. 510 (1991); Marshall A. Leafier, Of Moral
Rights and Resale Royalties: The Kennedy Bill, 7 CARwozo ARTS & Err. L.I. 234
(1989); Gilbert S. Edelson, The Case Against an American Droit de Suite, 7 Cia-
Dozo ATs & ENr. L.J. 260 (1989). California is the only state in the United States
that has enacted any such provision. See Artists' Resale Royalty Act, CAL. CMv.
CODE § 986 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991), offering qualifying artists economic rights
comparable to those given in some civil law jurisdictions under the droit de suite.
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nomic exploitation of copyrights differed significantly from one type
of copyrighted work to another. In particular, in order to secure the
passage of generally applicable moral rights legislation, influential
groups of copyright owners (such as motion picture producers and
periodical publishers) would need to be placated. Accordingly,
Congress decided to consider the claims of different types of au-
thors separately,4 6 and its first legislation in this area, the Visual Art-
ists Rights Act of 1990 (Title VI of the hA), is limited to a narrow
range of copyrighted works.4 7
The new law accords rights of "attribution" and "integrity" to au-
thors of a "work of visual art,"' 48 which is essentially limited to works
that are single copies or limited editions.49 While this limitation (in
46. While the considerable disagreement as to the moral rights that should be
granted with respect to motion pictures caused Congress to hesitate in extending
moral rights to such works, it has addressed the immediate concerns of artists re-
garding the colorization of motion pictures through the enactment of the National
Film Preservation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-446, 102 Stat. 1782 (1988), which
prevents the material alteration (including the colorization) of designated films un-
less the film is conspicuously labelled to indicate the alteration or colorization. Id.
at § 4. See Anna S. White, Comment, The Colorization Dispute: Moral Rights The-
ory As a Means of Judicial and Legislative Reform, 38 EmoRY L. 237, 267-276
(1989). This Act is scheduled to expire on September 27, 1991, and its proposed
successor, H.R. 2372, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), omits the "conspicuous label-
ling" requirement. In light of this development, the author of the film preservation
legislation, Rep. Robert J. Mrazek (D-N.Y.), has introduced a "Film Disclosure Bill,"
H.R. 3051, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), that would declare breaches of labelling
requirements to be violations of an amended Section 43 of the Lanham Act.
47. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 17 U.S.C.A.); H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st.Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1990). Existing
state and federal laws may still protect the moral rights of authors of works not
covered by this Act; rights under the common law or statutes of any state are pre-
empted only with respect to works of visual art to which the rights conferred by the
Visual Artists Rights Act apply. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(f(1) (West Supp. 1991).
48. Although the Act purports to apply to "works," it protects particular copies
rather than the incorporeal "work" as copyright law would regard that term. See
Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 481-84 (explaining the consequences of the Act protect-
ing copies, not the image depicted therein). For example, mass produced copies of
a work initially produced in a limited edition will not be protected notwithstanding
that they embody the same image as the initial edition.
49. The new law defines a "work of visual art" as:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecu-
tively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multi-
ple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are
consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other
identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, ex-
isting in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edi-
tion of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author.
17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1991). Specifically excluded from the definition
are works for hire, works not the subject of copyright protection, and any poster,
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effect, to works of "fine art" rather than those of mass production)
appears to flout the basic copyright principle of aesthetic neutrality,
it succeeds in targeting for protection works which are commonly
seen as the most appropriate recipients of moral rights.50
The right of attribution permits artists to claim and disclaim au-
thorship. The artist has the right to be identified with works which
are his or hers, and to prevent any identification with works that are
not. Similarly, the artist has the right to prevent identification with
any of his or her works which have been distorted, mutilated or
otherwise modified in a manner that would be prejudicial to the art-
ist's honor or reputation."1 The right of integrity gives visual artists
the right to prevent (i) any "intentional distortion, mutilation, or
other modification of [a] work [of visual art] which would be prejudi-
cial to his or her honor or reputation,"5 " or (ii) "any [intentional or
grossly negligent] destruction of a work of recognized stature."15 3
The term "work of recognized stature" is not elaborated upon in the
Act or legislative history. In an earlier version of the bill (H.R.
2690), Congress deleted the concept of a "work of recognized stat-
ure," commenting that such language would not only increase liti-
gation by creating "a battle of the expert witnesses" on the issue of
map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture
or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, database, elec-
tronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication, or any
merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering or packag-
ing material or container. See id.
50. See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 479 (arguing that the unique importance of
the physical object in the case of "works of visual art" sets moral rights in such
works apart from others).
51. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(1).(2) (West Supp. 1991).
52. The "honor" or "reputation" to be considered is the "artistic or professional
honor or reputation of the individual as embodied in the [protected] work.... [A]ny
evidence [of the general character of the plaintiff] is irrelevant." H.R. REP. No. 514,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1990). Modifications which are the result of the passage
of time or the inherent nature of the materials used by the artist do not constitute
"distortion[s], mutilation[s], or other modification[s]" within the meaning of the Act.
17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(c)(1) (West Supp. 1991). Similarly, modifications which are
the result of conservation efforts or the public presentation of the work are not ac-
tionable as "destruction[s], distortion[s], mutilation[s] or other modification[s]" unless
they are caused by gross negligence. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(c)(2) (West Supp.
1991). Accordingly, galleries and museums retain discretion as to lighting, place-
ment or framing of a work. Special rules and procedures are laid down with re-
spect to the removal of works of visual art incorporated into buildings. 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 113(d)(1) (West Supp. 1991); see generally Katherine Marik, The Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990: The United States Recognizes Artists and Their Rights, 8 ENr. &
SPORTS L. 7, 9-10 (1991). On August 13, 1991, the Copyright Office issued a final
regulation establishing a Visual Arts Registry for the filing of statements and docu-
mentation relating to works of visual art incorporated in buildings. Copyright Of-
fice Final Rule Establishing a Visual Arts Registry, 56 Fed. Reg. 38,340 (1991) (to
be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.25).
53. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(3) (West Supp. 1991).
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"recognized stature," but also might exclude from protection "less
well-known or appreciated artists [who] also have honor and reputa-
tion worthy of protection." 4 Its reintroduction in the final version of
the legislation - calling for judicial critique of the stature of art -
is unfortunate. All civil remedies available for copyright infringe-
ment 5 are available for any breach of these moral rights, 6
although infringement is not subject to criminal penalty.5 7
These rights are granted to the author of the work of visual art and
are independent of ownership of the copyright. The transfer of a
physical object embodying the work or the transfer of the copyright
in the work does not affect the ownership of the moral rights. Con-
versely, the waiver (to the extent permitted) of moral rights does not
operate to transfer, or in any way affect, the ownership of the physi-
cal object or the copyright in the work.5"
The moral rights granted by this Act endure for the life of the
author,5 9 although state laws extending protection beyond the life of
the author are not preempted by this limitation.60 The rights are
54. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1990).
55. Registration of authorship is not a prerequisite to the institution of a suit for
violation of moral rights or the availability of remedies. Registration does, how-
ever, remain a prerequisite for most copyright infringement actions, 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 411 (a) (West Supp. 1991), and even in those for which it is not (e.g., actions for
infringement of copyright in a "Berne Convention work"), failure to register may
limit the range of remedies at an owner's disposal. 17 U.S.C.A. § 412 (West Supp.
1991).
56. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(a) (West Supp. 1991). Although the Act extends the
copyright defense of fair use to actions for infringement of moral rights, JIA § 607,
Congress "recognize[d] that it is unlikely that such claims will be appropriate given
the limited number of works covered by the Act, and given that the modification of
a single copy or limited edition of a work of visual art has different implications for
the fair use doctrine than does an act involving a work reproduced in potentially
unlimited copies." H.R. RE. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1990).
57. 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(f) (West Supp. 1991).
58. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(e)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
59. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d)(1) (West Supp. 1991). But see infra note 60 (rights
with respect to works protected under JIA § 610(b)(1) endure for period co-exten-
sive with copyright). The term of protection for joint works extends for the life of
the last surviving author. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d)(3) (West Supp. 1991). "All terms
run... to the end of the calendar year in which they... expire [as in copyright]."
17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d)(4) (West Supp. 1991). Compare CDPA § 86 (moral rights
endure for period co-extensive with copyright, except right to prevent "false attri-
bution" which subsists until twenty years after author's death).
60. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(f)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1991). When, in the final version of
the bill, the duration of the rights granted was limited to the life of the author, this
provision became necessary in order to ensure compatibility with the Berne Con-
vention. H.R. 5316, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Cong Rec. 13314 (1990); Cf. Ginsburg,
supra note 7, at 484-85 (questioning United States compliance, on the national
level, with duration requirements of Article 6his of Berne Convention). The Act
applies only to acts committed, and works created, after its effective date, although
it will give coverage (against acts committed after that date) to works created
before then but in which the author still holds title. JIA § 610(b). The rights in this
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personal to the author and thus cannot be transferred.6 1 However,
the rights can be waived, permitting activities that otherwise would
be actionable. 2 In order to be effective the waiver instrument must
(a) be in writing, (b) be signed by the author, and (c) specifically
identify the work, and the uses of the work, to which the waiver ap-
plies.6 3 Moreover, any waiver that is obtained is personal to the re-
cipient; it cannot be transferred to a third party. A third party must
obtain a further waiver directly from the author.6 4
Finally, in light of the current debate upon government censor-
ship of art, the Act provides that "this title does not authorize any
governmental entity to take any action or enforce restrictions pro-
hibited by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.16 5
This supererogatory acknowledgment of the limits of Congressional
authority effects nothing; it is a political symbol and no more. With
or without such a declaration, Congress cannot authorize the viola-
tion of the United States Constitution. 6
latter category endure for a period co-extensive with the copyright. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(d)(2) (West Supp. 1991). The effective date of the Act is six months after its
enactment. hA § 610(a).
61. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(e)(1) (West Supp. 1991). The final version of the Visual
Artists Rights Act reduced the term of protection included in earlier versions of the
bill such that the rights of attribution and integrity generally do not endure beyond
the death of the author. Accordingly, it deleted a section that had provided that
upon the author's death the rights of attribution and integrity, and the authority to
waive them, vested according to state laws of testacy or intestacy. See, e.g., H.R.
2690, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1990). However, this deletion also excised any provision for the post-mortem own-
ership of rights with respect to works referred to in JIA § 610(b)(1), which may
endure beyond the death of the author. See supra note 60. There is no indication
that Congress intended to alter the earlier provision that state laws of testacy and
intestacy govern such ownership.
62. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(e)(1) (West Supp. 1991). While conceding that the
availability of waivers may operate to circumvent the effectiveness of these new
rights, Congress accepted that "the artist is better protected under a regime requir-
ing specificity of waivers than under one where an ideologipally pure no-waiver
law is rarely in fact observed." The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989: Hearings on
H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Adminis-
tration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 13
(1989) (statement of Prof. Jane C. Ginsburg). In the U.K., where similar reforms
were recently enacted, the availability of waivers, CDPA § 87, has led to claims
that writers' moral rights are being "trampled on." Simon Tait, Writers See Moral
Rights Lost Through Act Waiver, THE Tnyms, April 21, 1990. As a result of similar
concerns, the Act requires the Register of Copyrights to study and to report to Con-
gress on the extent that artists' rights have been waived. JIA § 608(a)(1).
63. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(e)(1) (West Supp. 1991). Blanket waivers for any pur-
pose will not be effective. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1990).
64. H.R. EP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1990). In the case of a joint
work, the waiver of rights by one author will bind his joint authors. 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 106A(e)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
65. JIA § 609.
66. One author has noted (and rejected) the comparison drawn by critics of the
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Computer Software Rental
The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, (Title
VIII of the HA), makes it an infringement of copyright to rent a com-
puter program for commercial purposes unless authorized by the
copyright owner.6 7 This Act extends to computer software the pro-
tections previously granted to phonorecords under United States
copyright law,"8 by creating an exception to the "first sale
doctrine."
The first sale doctrine, now contained in § 109(a) of the Copyright
Act,6 9 permits the owner of a lawfully made copy of a copyrighted
work to sell, otherwise dispose of, or use that copy without the copy-
right owner's permission. The 1984 Act restricted the first sale doc-
trine out of concern that the record rental business facilitated illicit
reproduction of copyrighted works. The recent amendments arise
out of a similar concern - what Congress perceived as the "embryo
of a business of rental of software for the purpose of copying."7 °
The prohibition on rental of computer software is subject to three
important exceptions. First, it does not apply to rentals for nonprofit
purposes by nonprofit libraries (provided that all copies of software
lent by such institutions bear a warning notice in the form pre-
scribed by the Register of Copyrights) or nonprofit educational insti-
tutions. Second, if a program is embodied in a machine or product
and that program cannot be copied during the ordinary operation of
the machine or product, the rental of that machine or product will
not be actionable. This exception ensures that the distribution of
many consumer products which contain computer programs (e.g.,
automobiles, calculators) will not be affected by the amendment. Fi-
nally, the prohibition does not extend to the rental of programs em-
bodied in, or used in conjunction with, "limited purpose computers"
(such as those designed for playing video games). The legislative
rationale for the last exception is the lack of evidence that the rental
market for electronic audiovisual games played on limited purpose
computers results in the copying of the programs that generate the
Act between the provisions of the flag desecration statute struck down by the
United States Supreme Court, Texas v. Iohnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (Act of burn-
ing American flag was expressive conduct protected by First Amendment.), and the
similar prohibition imposed by the Visual Artists Rights Act with respect to works of
visual art. Marik, supra note 52, at 10-11.
67. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5134 (1990) (codified in scattered sections
of 17 U.S.C.A.). The infringer in this situation is subject to civil but not criminal
sanctions. For a more detailed discussion of the Computer Software Rental Amend-
ments Act of 1990 see Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, The Computer Software
Rental Bill, N.Y. L.J. 3 (1990).
68. See Record Rental Amendment Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat.
1727 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1984 Act].
69. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1988).
70. S. REP. No. 265, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990).
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game."
This restriction of the owner's rights under the first sale doctrine
affects the creation for the copyright owner of the so-called "rental
right." Such a right was introduced into United Kingdom law by
Section 18(2) of the CDPA, and applies in the United Kingdom to
films in addition to sound recordings and computer programs. This
concept is affirmatively cast by the United Kingdom Act as the
copyright owner's exclusive right to rent copies to the public,
whereas United States law frames the issue negatively as a limitation
upon the rights afforded by the first sale doctrine. Additionally,
although under both United States and United Kingdom law the
copyright owner can refuse to permit rental, the United Kingdom
government - fearing resultant anti-competitive effects - has ex-
pressly reserved the power to introduce compulsory licensing.7 2
Fair Use
Earlier versions of this legislation contained provisions aimed at
permitting more extensive quotation from unpublished works.
These provisions were intended to assimilate the defense of "fair
use,"7 which allows the use of copyrighted material in a reasonable
71. H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1990). Unsuccessful attempts
were made in the last session of Congress to impose a limited prohibition against
the commercial rental, without the copyright owner's permission, of programs em-
bodied in electronic circuitry which is contained in, or used in conjunction with,
limited purpose computers designed primarily to play home video games, for the
period of one year from the date of their first commercial retail sale from inventory
in the United States. See H.R. 5297, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 40
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 276 (1990).
72. See CDPA § 66; see also White Paper, 1I 19.12. The issue has also been
considered at the European Community level. See Green Paper on Copyright and
The Challenge of Technology, COM(88)172 final at ch. 4.6-4.12; Working Pro-
gramme, ch. 4.3; Proposal For A Council Directive on Rental Right, Lending, and
Certain Rights Related to Copyright, Ch. 1, tdopted by the European Commission
on December 5, 1990.
73. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988); see generally Wna&m F. PATRY, THE FAir UsE
PmvuzoE m Copuorr LAw (1985). The defense of "fair use" approximates to that
of "fair dealing" in United Kingdom law. Cf. CDPA §§ 29-30. Early case law sug-
gested that unpublished works were to be given absolute protection from unauthor-
ized publication, Prince Albert v. Strange, [18491 64 Eng. Rep. 293, 2 De G. & Sm.
652, on appeal [1849] 41 Eng. Rep. 1171, 1 Mac. & G. 25, and that, accordingly,
the defense of fair dealing was inapplicable to such works. British Oxygen Co.,
Ltd. v. Liquid Air, Ltd., [1925] Ch. 383, 393. However, while the unpublished na-
ture of the work remains a factor to be considered, Beloff v. Pressdram, Ltd., [1973]
1 All E.R. 241, 263, it is probably no longer an absolute bar to the defense of fair
dealing. Id. See also Hubbard v. Vosper, [1972] 2 Q.B. 84, 94-95 (Fair dealing
can be defense to unauthorized publication of a work which, although not pub-
lished to the world at large, was widely circulated.); Distillers Co. (Biochemicals)
Ltd. v. Times Newspapers, Ltd., [1975] 1 Q.B. 613, 625 (unpublished materials pro-
duced during discovery not so widely circulated that their unauthorized publication
by a newspaper could constitute fair dealing). Cf. Higgins v. Hindley, Ct. App.,
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manner without the copyright owner's consent, with respect to both
published and unpublished material. In Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters.,7 4 the United States Supreme Court, in re-
jecting a fair use defense, commented that "the unpublished nature
of a work is '[a] key, though not necessarily determinative factor"'
and that "[t]he scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpub-
lished works."' 7- The proposed reforms were sought by publishers,
particularly of biographies, in the wake of subsequent Second Cir-
cuit decisions in Salinger v. Random House, Inc.7 6 and New Era
Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co. (New Era I,"7 which, in
purporting to follow Harper & Row, severely restricted the use of
unpublished materials.
However, concerns were expressed by the computer industry that
the proposal would lessen the protection afforded computer pro-
grams (which are, in the main, technically unpublished), and these
concerns ultimately resulted in the exclusion of the fair use amend-
ments from the final package of reforms. 78 In presenting the final
version of the bill to Congress, Rep. Kastenmeier (D-Wis.), chairper-
son of the House sub-committee that deals with copyright, expressed
his regret that an agreement could not be reached between publish-
ers and the computer industry but noted that "this remains an impor-
tant policy issue for Congress."79 The continuing importance of the
issue was emphasized when a similar fair use reform bill was imme-
diately introduced in the new session of Congress."0
Civ. Div. (Aug. 24, 1983), esp. per Kerr, L.J. (There would be no arguable defense
of fair dealing were it not for the previous publication of the work.). Although the
defense of fair dealing was broadened by the CDPA, British Broadcasting Corp. v.
British Satellite Broadcasting Ltd., [1991] 3 W.L.R. 174, 177, that change did not
purport to alter the relevance of the unpublished nature of a work to the scope of
the defense. That the permissible unauthorized use of unpublished works would be
lesser in the United Kingdom is to be expected because of a less developed right to
privacy, which could operate to prevent intrusion into private affairs, than there is
in the United States. Pierre N. Leval, Towards A Fair Use Standard, 103 Himv. L.
REV. 1105, 1129 (1990).
74. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
75. Id. at 554.
76. 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)i rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), reh'g de-
nied, 818 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
77. 684 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y.), 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd on
other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 884 F.2d 659 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990).
78. See Roger Cohen, Software Issue Kills Liberal Amendment to Copyright
Laws, N.Y. Tn.ms, Oct. 13, 1990, at Al; H.R. 5498, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., (1990).
79. H.R. 5498, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. Cong. Rec. 8270 (1990). It also remains
an important issue for writers. The Authors Guild, a writers' organization, has re-
cently formed the Committee to Preserve Fair Use to press for legislation that
would define writers' right to make fair use of unpublished materials. See Roger
Cohen, Writers Mobilizing Against Restrictions on Using Quotations, N.Y. Tnms,
Feb. 20, 1991, at Cl.
80. See S. 1035, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (proposing addition to the fair
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Arguably, the concerns provoked among publishers by the above
decisions should have been somewhat alleviated by the subsequent
decisions of the Second Circuit in New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v.
Carol Publiszing Group (New Era 1) l and Wright v. Warner
Books, Inc.82
In Wright, both Judge Walker, in the District Court, and the Court
of Appeals expressly rejected the proposition - which publishers
feared followed from the Salinger and New Era I decisions - that
there is a per se rule against copying unpublished expressive mate-
rial.8 3  Although New Era 11 dealt specifically with the permissible
use of published material, the court accepted the principle that ex-
pressive material can be used to convey facts, and thus can be per-
missibly quoted under the doctrine of fair use.8 4 The rejection of
this argument by the majority in New Era I'5 was perceived as a
central prop of the barrier erected by the New Era I court against
the copying of unpublished material.8"
use section of the Act providing that "the fact that a work is unpublished is an
important element which tends to weigh against a finding of fair use, but shall not
diminish the importance traditionally accorded to any other consideration under
this section, and shall not bar a finding of fair use, if such finding is made upon full
consideration of all [other] factors"); H.R. 2372, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
81. 729 F. Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111
S.Ct. 297 (1990).
82. 748 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, No. 90-9054 (2d Cir. Nov. 21,
1991) (A biographer's minimal use of quotations from, and paraphrasing of, the
unpublished writing of a deceased author constituted fair use.).
83. Wright, 748 F. Supp. at 111; No. 90-9054, slip op. at 19 (2d Cir. Nov. 21,
1991) (although concluding, contrary to District Court, that "nature of copyrighted
work," in fair use analysis favored plaintiff, affirming that "[n]either Salinger,
Harper & Row, nor any other case... erected a per se rule regarding unpublished
works.").
84. New Era 1, 904 F.2d at 156.
85. New Era I, 873 F.2d at 583, 884 F.2d at 660-61.
86. Judges in the Second Circuit have elaborated upon their views in Salinger
and New Era I not only in subsequent decisions, but also in testimony to Congress
on the proposed legislation and in various legal publications and lectures. See,
e.g., Hearings on H.R. 4263 and S. 2370, Unpublished Works and Fair Use, Before
the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Jus-
tice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (State-
ments of Chief Judge Oakes and Judges Leval and Miner); Jon 0. Newman, Not the
End of History: The Second Circuit Struggles with Fair Use, 37 J. CoPyRrGHT Soc'y
12 (1989); Jon 0. Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, 12
CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARs 459 (1988); Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul?: The Nine-
teenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 36 J. Cop HoTr Soc'y 167 (1989);
Pierre N. Level, Comment, Towards a Fair Use Standard, 103 HAv. L. Rnv. 1105
(1990); Roger J. Miner, Exploiting Stolen Text: Fair Use or Foul Play, 37 J. Copy-
zomr Soc'Y 1 (1989); James L. Oakes, Copyrights and Copyremedies: Unfair Use
and Injunctions, 18 Homs=A L. REv. 983 (1990); see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The
Shrihking Back: The Law of Biography, 43 STjw. L. REv. 299, 312-33 (1991); Lloyd
L. Weinreb, Comment, Fair's Fair: A Comm ent on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HRav.
L. R v. 1137 (1990); Vincent H. Peppe, Note, Fair Use of Unpublished Materials in
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The reversal of these apparently prevailing principles suggests
that the Second Circuit is, from within the confines imposed by the
Supreme Court in Harper & Bow, attempting to articulate an ap-
proach that permits a degree of access to unpublished material that
exceeds the restrictive edict of Salinger.s 7 If that is the case, the
problems experienced by Congress in balancing competing inter-
ests may warrant that the issue be left to the courts to resolve in
conformity with existing principles.
COPYRIGHT REMEDY CLARIFICATION ACT
The Copyright Remedy Clarification Act makes clear that states,
their instrumentalities, and officers and employees of states acting in
their official capacities, are liable for infringement of copyright
and that the remedies available for such infringement are the same
as in any suit against a private person.88 The need for such a clarifi-
cation stems from the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon.8 9 In Atascadero, the Court
held that Congress can only abrogate the Eleventh Amendment,
which provides states with immunity from suits in federal court90 for
the Second Circuit: The Letters of the Law, 54 BRooLYN L. REv. 417 (1988); Chris-
topher A. Murphy, Note, Salinger v. Random House: The Author's Interests in Un-
published Materials, 12 CoLu.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 103 (1987).
87. See David Goldberg and Robert J. Bernstein, An Update on Fair Use, N.Y.
L.I., Oct. 19, 1990, at 3, (concluding that "future Second Circuit panels will be
more receptive to the fair use defense in the context of biographical works quoting
from unpublished materials."); see also Melvin L. Wulff, The Fair Use Doctrine
After 'New Era, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 7, 1990, at 1.
88. Copyright Remedy Clarification Act § 2(a), 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 501(a), 511
(West Supp. 1991). The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 901-914 (1988)), is also
amended similarly to abrogate states' immunity. Copyright Remedy Clarification
Act, § 2(b), 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 910(a), 911(g) (West. Supp. 1991). In Chew v. Califor-
nia, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 44 (1990), the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit held that states are immune from liability for damages
in patent infringement suits. See also Kersavage v. University of Tenn., 731 F.
Supp. 1327 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (state university was absolutely immune under Elev-
enth Amendment from all claims for damages or injunctive relief sought in patent
infringement suit brought in federal court). This prompted the introduction of a
parallel bill in the field of patents which would have eliminated the immunity, the
Patent Remedy Clarification Bill, H.R. 3886, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R.
5598, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). This bill made no progress during the last
session of Congress. Since the demise of the bill, the courts have refused to limit
the holding of Chew. See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 919
F.2d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1990), leading to the prompt reintroduction of the Patent and
Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Bill, S. 578, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991), in the new session of Congress, on March 21, 1991. On the same day, the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Bill, S. 579, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991), which
would similarly amend the Lanham Act, was also introduced.
89. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
90. As a result of exclusive federal jurisdiction over copyright claims under 17
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money damages, 9 1 by "making its intention unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute."9 2
Prior to Atascadero, some courts had concluded that the language
of the Copyright Act sufficiently evinced a Congressional intent to
abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity. 93 However,
Atascadero, in the opinion of one court, "wiped the slate clean, '94
and the increased stringency of its test was the basis for a series of
appellate decisions refusing to hold state entities9" liable for copy-
right infringement because the Copyright Act did not demonstrate
unequivocal congressional intent to do so.96 The courts that ren-
U.S.C. § 301 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988), state claims are unavailable to
redress copyright infringement. Accordingly, the restrictions of the Eleventh
Amendment operate in this context to determine not where a claim may be pur-
sued, but whether a claim may be pursued. Courts deciding this issue noted the
concern evoked by exclusivity of jurisdiction, but felt constrained by Atascadero to
decide as they did. Lane v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 871 F.2d 166, 173-74 (1st
Cir. 1989); BV Engineering v. University of Cal., Los Angeles, 858 F.2d 1394,
1400 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989). However, support for a
distinction based upon exclusive federal jurisdiction can be found in the language
of Atascadero itself. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 240 n.2.
91. Some of the cases declining to permit money damages have, however, sug-
gested that prospective injunctive relief may be available against the states. See
Lane, 871 F.2d at 174.
92. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242. See also Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways
and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987); Jeffrey S. Schira, Note, Sovereign Immu.
nity to Copyright Infringement Actions After Atascadero, 50 Omo ST. L.J. 197
(1989).
93. See, e.g., Mills Music, Inc. v. State of Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1284-86 (9th
Cir. 1979); Johnson v. University of Virginia, 606 F. Supp. 321, 324 (W.D. Va.
1985); see also Susan Shoenfeld, The Applicability of Eleventh Amendment Immu-
nity Under the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, 36 AM. U.L. Rzv. 163 (1986); see
generally John C. Better, Note, Copyright Infringement and the Eleventh Amend-
ment: A Doctrine of Unfair Use?, 40 Vmn. L. REv. 225 (1987).
94. Lane, 871 F.2d at 169.
95. Damages may be available against the infringing individuals in their per-
sonal capacity. See e.g., Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114,
122 (4th Cir. 1988) ("The mere fact that [the official's] conduct was undertaken in
the course of her state employment does not of course relieve her of individual
liability, even if her employer could not be sued for it. A state may no more than an
individual principal give its agent authority to commit torts without civil re-
course."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989). See also Lane, 871 F.2d at 174
("[plaintiff] may... sue the responsible officials in their individual capacities for
money damages"). Additionally, one court, while declining to permit suit against
the state, noted that private parties may be sued for abetting the wrongful acts. Id.
96. See, e.g., Richard Anderson Photography, 852 F.2d 114 (state university
immune from damages suit for copyright infringement stemming from unauthorized
use of plaintiff's photographs); BV Engineering, 858 F.2d 1394 (state university
immune from liability for infringement of copyright in computer programs and ac-
companying user manuals); Lane, 871 F.2d 166 (Commonwealth of Massachusetts
immune from liability for infringement of copyright in compilations of financial
data); see also Woelffer v. Happy States of America, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 499, 504(N.D. M1l. 1985) ("The sweeping language employed by Congress arguably in-
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dered these decisions were aware of the consequences. However,
the responsibility for meeting the Atascadero standard lay with
Congress. 97
In 1990, Congress took up the challenge and passed the Copy-
right Remedy Clarification Act.98 This statute confirms that Con-
gress does intend, and did originally intend,9 9 to abrogate the states'
immunity for copyright infringement. The Act should resolve
problems that had occurred particularly in the market for educa-
tional materials. Testimony before the House sub-committee in con-
nection with earlier versions of the bill revealed that two public
universities had withdrawn from negotiations with the Copyright
Clearance Center for a photocopying license because they be-
lieved they were immune from liability. 0 Such potential disregard
of copyrights existed not only in universities, and not only with re-
spect to photocopying; in theory, any state institution previously
could have decided to ignore the copyright law with apparent impu-
nity. As a result, lucrative markets, such as educational computer
software, would have been affected. The Copyright Remedy Clarifi-
cludes states within the class of copyright ... infringers. Under Atascadero, how-
ever, this is not enough to abrogate sovereign immunity.").
97. See, e.g., BVEngineering, 858 F.2d at 1400 ("We recognize that our hold-
ing will allow states to violate the federal copyright laws with virtual impunity. It is
for Congress, however, to remedy this problem."). See also Lane, where the Court
observed that:
We are not without sympathy for [plaintiff 's] plight. It can persuasively
be argued that our holding today, rather than furthering Congress' en-
couragement of creative endeavor, undermines it - and does so without a
correspondingly beneficial tradeoff. If the objectives of the Copyright Act
and the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment are weighed with no thumb
on the scale, the societal balance likely tips in favor of abrogation. Yet
courts are not free in instances like this to impose their value judgements
on the community; policy choices of this kind are for the legislative, not
the Judicial branch.
871 F.2d at 175.
98. It has long been settled that Congress could legislate to remove states' im-
munity when acting to enforce the substantive provisions of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). However, at the time of
Atascadero it remained an open question whether it could do so when legislating
pursuant to a provision enacted anterior to the Eleventh Amendment. The Supreme
Court has since determined, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989),
that Congress can, and it is submitted that there is no basis upon which to distin-
guish between its authority to do so under the Commerce Clause and its authority
pursuant to the Copyright Clause.
99. The amendments made by this Act, however, shall only affect violations that
occur on or after the enactment of the Act. See Copyright Remedy Clarification
Act § 3.
100. Copyright Remedy Clarification Act: Hearings on HR. 1131 Before the
House Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Statement of Myer Kutz, John Wiley & Sons Inc.),
quoted in 38 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 291 (1989).
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cation Act should make investment in markets such as educational
materials more secure.
CONCLUSION
These reforms not only introduce substantive rights for visual art-
ists and architects and close loopholes in existing copyright protec-
tion. They also provide welcome evidence that, rather than
inducing complacency, United States accession to the Berne Con-
vention has provided the impetus for further critical assessment by
Congress of the adequacy of intellectual property protection in the
United States.

